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Running Backs, Recruiting, and
Remedies: College Football Coaches,
Recruits, and the Torts of Negligent
and Fraudulent Misrepresentation
To me, the coachingprofession is one of the noblest and most far-reaching
in building manhood .. to befair-minded.. .to dealjustly... to be honest in
thinking and square in dealing... these should be the ideals of the coach. "1
Amos Alonzo Stagg
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sugar Bowl game played on January 7, 2008, saw the
culmination of arguably one of the most intriguing years in the
history of college football. The BCS National Championship Game
pitted the Louisiana State Tigers, a team with two losses during
the regular season, against the Ohio State Buckeyes, a team with
one loss during the regular season and no conference title game
under its belt. While some argued that this type of season was
good for the game, the familiar chants of the desire for a national
championship playoff echoed through the halls of many sports
networks and the pages of many sports columnists. 2 However,
there was another word on the tip of the tongue of many college
football fans, sports columnists and especially college football
3
coaches: parity.
With the 2007-2008 season being deemed the "year of the

1. Rick Telander, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE 81 (University of Illinois Press
1996) (1989).

2.

See Pete Thamel, For B.C.S., Let the Season of DiscussionBegin, N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at D3.

3.

See Pete Thamel, Rich Rodriguez, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at 8.

128 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:127
upset,"4 the issue of parity is now discussed in college football

circles. This begs the question of why do we no longer have
dominating football teams in college football. Certainly, this topic
is well outside the scope of this paper and more suitable for
discussion in a less academic venue.
However, one strong
argument is particularly relevant for this paper: coaches have
become more sophisticated at recruiting high school athletes.
Many college football coaches will stop at nothing in order to
obtain the best players for their team. During recruiting, "the
coach promises them the world: that over the next four of five
years they will become a star, be ready for the pros, or get into the
academic program they want."' 5
Sometimes, they push the
boundaries of civilized behavior and arguably the boundaries of
tort law. Great football players mean wins and wins mean job
security or advancement to the "perfect" coaching job.

The

coaching carousel in college football is well-known. 6 However,
this is more of a modern day phenomena. Gone are the days when
coaches such as Dr. Tom Osborne stayed with the same institution
for 25 years and later came out of retirement to help their former
employer. 7 Some would also suggest that gone are the days of the
honest football coach.
There are three historical events that made recruiting high
school football players particularly important to the success of
college football teams and the men who coach them. College
football is heavily regulated by the NCAA with rules that govern
both universities and student-athletes. 8 Changes in these rules
helped create this level of parity and the overwhelming
competition for the best recruits. 9 The first change was a

4. Larry Dorman, For U.S.C. and Illinois, Upsets Aren't Foreign, N.Y.
Jan. 1, 2008, at D3.
5. Stacey Meyer, Unequal Bargaining Power: Making the National
Letter of Intent More Equitable, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 227, 227 (Fall 2004).
6. See Dave Fairbank, Coaches Talk the Talk, Then Walk, DAILY PRESS,
Dec. 20, 2007, at C1.
7. Brian Christopherson, Osborne's No Longer Interim, LINCOLN
JOURNAL STAR, Dec. 20, 2007, at D1.
8. 27A Am. Jur. 2d Entertainment and Sports Law §53.
9. As a matter of fact, one of the primary goals of the NCAA constitution
and its bylaws is to create a "level playing field". See NCAA General
Brochure 2003 at 4, http://www.ncaa.org/library/general/general-brochure
/2003/2003_geninfo.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
TIMES,
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reduction in the number of allowable scholarships from an
unlimited number to 95 in 1977, then to 85 in 1992 with no more
than 25 in one year. 10 Because each prospect's value increased
with the reduction in the total amount of scholarships, it became
critical to avoid the "recruiting mistake" through solid
investigation of high school players. Second, there came an end to
freshman football teams. Prior to 1968, Division I football teams
could maintain a "freshman squad" because all freshmen were
ineligible to play their first year in school. 1 1 These freshman
squads had their own coaches, played other teams, and often
practiced against the varsity squad. 12 Arguably, this allowed for
the physical, intellectual and emotional development of young
football players. Today, many freshman football players are
expected to contribute immediately and are often told as much
during the recruiting process. Third, the NCAA continuing
eligibility rules were reformed for all student-athletes. The socalled "40/60/80" rule, 13 the "6 hour rule", 14 the implementation of
16
the Graduation Success Rate 15 and the Academic Progress Rate

10. Daniel Sutter & Stephen Winkler, NCAA Scholarship Limits and
Competitive Balance in College Football, 4 JOURNAL OF SPORTS ECON. 3, 3
(February 2003). These scholarship limits apply to Football Bowl Subdivision
(former Division I) only. Id.
11. NCAA Presidential Task Force on the Future of Division I
Intercollegiate Athletics Student-Athlete Well-Being Subcommittee, (June
2005),
www.ncaa.org/portal/legislation-and_governance/committees/
future_task_force/well-being/freshman.doc (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
12. See id.
13. For a student-athlete to be eligible to compete, he must have 40% of
his degree program completed by the end of his second year in school, 60% by
the end of his third year, and 80% by the end of his fourth year. NCAA, 20072008 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL: CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS,
ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAws, Bylaw 14.4.3.2 (National Collegiate Athletic
Association 2007) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
14. In order to be eligible for post season competition, a student-athlete
must pass, "Six semester or six quarter hours of academic credit during the
preceding regular academic term..." NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw
14.4.3.1(c). Florida State played without 23 football players in the Music City
Bowl because of academic ineligibility. See Joshua Robinson, New Rule May
FactorInto Bowl Ineligibility, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008, at D3.
15. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 23.02.2 requiring each
member institution to maintain long term graduation statistics on those
scholarship student-athletes who have exhausted their eligibility. Penalties
are imposed for failure to maintain a minimum rate. See NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 14, Bylaw 23.2.
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have imposed harsh penalties on both the athlete and the
institution if a player thinks he will just "play ball' and avoid
going to school. Recruiting the whole person, rather than just the
athlete, is now the mantra that the majority of most college
football coaches follow.
Naturally, when you find a player who is an exceptional
athlete, student and person, the competition to sign him to a
National Letter of Intent ("NLI") 17 on signing day is intense. The
NCAA has attempted to mitigate this intensity by imposing a
wide variety of recruiting rules including "Dead Periods", ' 8 official
visit limitations, 19 and limits on telephone calls. 20 These are but
a few examples from an entire chapter dedicated to recruiting
rules in the NCAA Division I Handbook. However, what is
noticeably absent in the NCAA regulations or anywhere else are
restrictions on what a college football coach can say to a
prospective student athlete during the recruiting process to entice
them to commit.
Prospective student-athletes sign an NLI
binding them to a list of things that they agree to do for the
university. 2 1 Very little, other than a financial aid agreement,
lists what the coach will do for the athlete. What happens when a
coach says he will or will not do something for the prospective

16. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 23.02.1 requiring each
member institution to maintain statistics on the academic eligibility and the
retention of scholarship athletes currently enrolled at their respective
institution. Penalties are imposed for failure to maintain a minimum rate.
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 23.2.
17. The National Letter of intent is a program run by the Collegiate
Commissioners Association where prospective student athletes sign a letter
certifying they will enroll at a college or university during a specific academic
term. See http://www.national-letter.org/overview/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2008).
18. "A dead period is that period of time when it is not permissible to
make in-person recruiting contacts or evaluations on or off the member
institution's campus or to permit official or unofficial visits..." NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.02.4.4.
19. "A member institution may finance only one visit to its campus for a
prospective student-athlete" NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.6.2.1.
20. "...staff members shall not make such telephone calls more than once
per week." NCAA MANUAL, supranote 14, Bylaw 13.1.3.1.
21. The full text of an actual NLI and guidelines of the National Letter of
Intent program can be seen at, http://www.national-letter.org/ (last visited
Jan. 28, 2008). Scholarship award letters vary by institution and are only for
one year terms. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 15.3.3.1.
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student-athlete and fails to keep his promise? If a Prospective
Student-Athlete ("PSA") fails to keep his promise he looses a year
of eligibility. What happens when a coach fails to keep his?
A tremendous amount of excellent legal research has been
done on the contractual obligations of a student-athlete when
signing an NLI or a scholarship award letter. 2 2 In fact, the
majority of the research examining a PSA's legal rights in the
23
recruiting process has focused on contractual rights.
Additionally, a significant amount of research has been performed
on alleged PSA fraud, such as PSAs lying about their academic
24
record in order to meet NCAA initial eligibility requirements.
However, little research has been done on what type of
repercussions there are for the coaching staff when they commit
fraud during the recruiting process.
This article will address fraudulent misrepresentation
committed by coaches during the recruiting process and whether
there is any cause of action in tort as opposed to contract. Current
NCAA legislation focuses on the misconduct of the PSA rather
than the misconduct of the coaching staff. There is little if any
remedy for a PSA who has been "wronged" during the recruiting
process. Further, it is important to note that fraudulent
misrepresentation during recruiting is particularly damaging for a
college football player's career as opposed to future careers in
other sports. Because of the "three year rule" 25 in the NFL
requiring NFL prospects to be three years removed from high
school before becoming eligible for the draft, a premium is placed
on a football player's college career. Baseball players, hockey
players and college basketball players either have shorter wait
times for draft eligibility 2 6 or are eligible for the draft any time
22. For example see Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and
the College National Letter of Intent: A Contract by Any Other Name, 35
WAYNE L. REV. 1275 (1989).
23. See id.
24. For example see Josephine R. Potuto, Academic Misconduct, Athletics
Academic Support Services, and the NCAA, 95 KY. L.J. 447 (2006-2007).
25. See Memorandum from Rachel Newman Baker, director of Agent,
Gambling and Amateurism Activities to the Collegiate Commissioners Ass'n
20, 2007),
available at
(April
Administrators
of Compliance
wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/enforcement/amateurism/resources/2007_NFLP
AContractAdvisorNewRegulationsFAQ.doc.
26. A basketball player is eligible for the NBA draft one year out of high
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after high school. 2 7 The importance for the PSA of making the
right decision during recruiting is much higher in football than in
other sports. 28 If a PSA has the goal of playing in the NFL, the
"three year rule" and the NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision
transfer rules 29 (to be discussed infra) make it difficult to mitigate
any damages that may result in making the wrong decision.
30
Therefore this article will focus on the sport of football.
First, this paper will take a brief look at the recruiting process
to expose how the potential avenues for fraud can be high in spite
of NCAA regulations. Second, this article will address the three
most common ways coaches entice a PSA to sign an NLI:
promising to change the playbook for him, promising he will not
leave the institution and promising that the PSA will start as a
true freshman. Third, this paper will discuss the difficulties of
pursuing a cause of action in contract under an NLI or a financial
aid agreement. Finally, this paper will address a possible cause of
action for a PSA in tort, what a possible remedy could be, how
potential proof problems can be overcome and how a plaintiff can
address the difficulty in quantifying damages.

school.
See
2007-2008
NBA
CBA,
Article
X
§
1,
http://www.nbpa.com/cbaarticles/article-X.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
27. A baseball player is eligible for the draft immediately out of high
school.
See MLB
First Year Player
Draft, Official Rules,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
28. Adding to this urgency is the NCAA rule for the sports of football,
men's and women's basketball and men's ice hockey that if a student-athlete
transfers to another Division I institution, they must sit out one year while
their 5-year "clock" continues to run. If he transfers within the same
conference, the student-athlete must sit out two years. See NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 14, Bylaw 14.5.1.
29. It should be noted that a football student-athlete could transfer down
a division to the Football Championship Subdivision (former I-AA) and
become immediately eligible. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw
14.5.5.2.10 (a).
30. This is not to say that misrepresentation by head coaches during
recruiting does not occur in other sports. The trials and tribulations of
Indiana's former head basketball coach Kelvin Sampson is just one notable

example. See N.C.A.A. says Sampson Made Illegal Calls at Indiana, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 14, 2008, at D4.
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II. THE COLLEGE FOOTBALL RECRUITING PROCESS: A PRIMER

Recruiting is arguably one of the most regulated aspects of
college football and college athletics in general. 3 1 It all begins
September 1st of the PSA's junior year of high school when
recruiting materials may be sent to the PSA. 32 These materials are
printed materials and encompass items such as questionnaires,
athletics publications, game programs, pre-enrollment information
and institutional note cards. 3 3 The majority of these documents
are general in nature discussing the virtues of both the football
program and the university. 34 Occasionally there will be a
personalized message to the PSA, but the majority of the
correspondence is broad in nature.
Not until telephone conversations are allowed does the
intensity of recruiting begin to heat up. A college football
"representative" 35 can make only one call between April 15th and
May 31st of a PSA's junior year. 3 6 There can be no further verbal
discussions between the PSA and the coach until the beginning of
the PSA's senior year. 3 7 This makes the first impression critical.
There will be a long time period before the coach will talk with the
student again. Little is known about what the coach says to the

31. In fact, an entire bylaw is devoted to recruiting, See NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 14, Bylaw 13. It encompasses 47 pages in the Division I manual.
Id. A very close second is Academic Edibility (Bylaw 14) with 42 pages. See
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 14. However, many of those pages in
bylaw 14 involve initial eligibility, academic requirements needed to begin
participation in Division I sports. Id.
32. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.4.1.
33. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.4.1.1.
34. Because of the competitiveness of college football recruiting, it is
almost impossible to obtain actual copies of recruiting letters. An example of
one can be found
at http://athletics.sewanee.edu/athletics/football
recletter?id=17378 (Last visited Mar. 30, 2008). However, this letter is not
from a Football Bowl Subdivision School. For an example of a Football Bowl
Subdivision
questionnaire
see,
https://www.cyberquestlive.com/
schools/coloradofb/?SPSID=3843&SPID=255&DBOEMID=600 (last visited
Mar. 30, 2007).
35. This is the terminology used by the NCAA. See NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 14, Bylaw 13.02.13. As noted in the description, a representative
is more than just a coach, but includes a wide variety of people. Id. But due
to the limited amount of calls each institution has per PSA, it is more than
likely to be a football coach making the call.
36. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.1.3.1.1.

37. Id.
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PSA, and the NCAA rules provide almost no guidance as to what
is appropriate conduct during this telephone conversation. 38 The
other interactions between a PSA and a coach during his junior
year are limited to evaluations where coaches watch a PSA either
practice or play in an actual football game. 3 9
The most critical time in the recruiting cycle of a football PSA
is during his senior year when college football coaches are allowed
to dramatically step up their personal recruitment of PSAs.
Beginning on September 1st of a PSA's senior year an athletics
representative may call the PSA once per week. 40 While that may
seem like an insignificant amount, there are 120 institutions that
sponsor Football Bowl Subdivision football, 4 1 all competing
against each other for the top prospects. This could lead to an
astounding number of phone calls each week between eager
coaches and PSAs. During the PSA's senior year, official visits are
allowed beginning on the first day of the recruiting institution's
classes. 42 Official visits are visits to the recruiting institution's
campus that are paid for by the university subject to certain
limitations. 4 3 Official visits are critical for a PSA because he is
limited to five total visits to five different institutions. 44 By the
time a PSA goes on an official visit, it is more than likely the
sponsoring institution represents one of the PSA's top choices.

38. The only warning is at the beginning of bylaw 13 stating if a PSA is
recruited in violation of NCAA rules it, "shall result in the student-athlete's

becoming ineligible to represent that institution in intercollegiate athletics."
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 10.01.1. There is little discussion
about the coach's responsibility other than a general warning to recruit PSA's
according the rules. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 10.01.2. There is
no discussion of the penalties for a coaching staff. Id.
39. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.1. Rarely does actual
contact between a PSA and a college football coach occur during this time
unless it is "unavoidable incidental contact." See NCAA MANUAL, supra note
14, Bylaw 13.1.2.2 (g).
40. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.1.3.1.1.
41. Football Bowl Subdivision, http://webl.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec/
sponsorship?sortOrder=O&division= A&sport=MFB (Last visited, Jan. 21,
2008).
42. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.6.2.2.1
43. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.02.5.1 (e).
44. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.6.2.2. However, unofficial
visits, where the PSA pays his own way are unlimited. See NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 14, Bylaw 13.7.1.
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A. Opportunities for Fraudulent or Negligent Misrepresentation
During Recruiting: Three Scenarios
After a PSA has limited his decision to his top five teams, the
competition to secure a PSA by having him sign an NL14 5 becomes
increasingly intense. The plethora of college football recruiting
websites 46 helps add to the drama by announcing who is
recruiting whom. During a typical official visit, a PSA will tour
the campus, meet with campus professors, current football players
and most importantly, have the closed door visit with the head
football coach. While coaches are certainly "selling" their program
throughout the entire recruiting process, it is during these private
meetings, outside the view of the NCAA, 4 7 where what is told to a
football recruit is both influential and potentially troubling.
The push to obtain the best of the best often causes coaches to
bring their promises to the edge of truthfulness and beyond. The
stakes are incredibly high for both the PSA and the college
football coach. As stated previously, the majority of NCAA rules
focus on the misconduct of the PSA or student-athlete, not the
coach. Even if a coach does commit a recruiting violation, it is the
institution that must bear the burden of punishment. 4 8 While the
PSA may not have a remedy from the NCAA when he has have
been lied to in the recruiting process, he does have a remedy
against
the coach in
tort: fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation.
A statement becomes a fraudulent
misrepresentation when, "the maker knows or believes that the
matter is not as he represents it to be, does not have the
confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or
45. The National Letter of Intent program (NLI) is not sponsored by the
NCAA but serves as a contractual way to bind the PSA to the institution. See
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14 Bylaw 13.02.10. After a PSA signs an NLI, he
must now abide the transfer rules discussed in the introduction.
46. For example see www.rivals.com (Last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
47. There are many things that must be documented during the
recruiting process including the number of official visits taken, who were the
student hosts during the trip, and receipt of official transcripts. Discussions
with the head football coach are not documented in any way.
48. See B.G. Brooks, Athlete's Meal Violations Prove Costly; NCAA Levies
Fine of $100,000 as well as Probation, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 22, 2007 at

11. The University of Colorado lost football scholarships for a period of three
years for the recruiting violations of their previous football coach Rich
Neuheisel. Id.
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implies, or knows that he does not have the basis for his
representation that he states or implies." 49 A statement is
classified as negligent misrepresentation when one, "supplies false
information for the guidance of others . . .if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information." 50 As the following three scenarios indicate, the
plausibility of football coaches committing misrepresentation is
real.
(1) Scenario One: Son, I'm Changing the Playbook for You
One of the top prospects of the 2008 college football recruiting
class is Terrelle Pryor, a 6-foot-6 quarterback from Pennsylvania,
whose autographed footballs sell for $99.99 on eBay, who has his
own Wikipedia entry, 51 and who is compared to former University
of Texas quarterback Vince Young. 52 The intensity among schools
competing for Pryor's services has been so extreme that, at one
point, he received up to 50 text messages per hour from recruiters,
and one football coach asked if he could bring a helicopter to land
on the front lawn of his high school. 5 3 The first school Pryor
visited was Ohio State, and he mentioned how much he enjoyed
quarterback coach Joe Daniels, head coach Jim Tressel and the
other recruits. 54 The type of offense that Pryor ran while in high
school and what he seeks to run in college is the spread offense, a
type of offense involving a strong focus on the passing game with
many receivers "spread" over the width of the field. Ohio State
runs the traditional I-formation offense with a strong emphasis on
the power running game. This type of offense has been Ohio
State's staple for many years and is a common offense played in
the Big Ten conference. Pryor mentioned that during recruiting
Tressel promised he would change the offense from the I-

§ 526 (1977).
§ 552 (1977).
51. See www.Wikipedia.com, Terrelle Pryor, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
TerrellePryor (last visited, Feb. 15, 2008).
52. Thayer Evans, Recruiting Intensifies for Can't Miss Prospect, N.Y.
TIMES, January 5, 2008 at D4. Vince Young was named one top 25 players in
the history of college football by ESPN. See http://sports.espn.go.com
ncflnews/story?id=3086827 (last visited, Jan. 21, 2008).
53. Evans, supra note 53, at D4.
54. Id.
49.
50.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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formation to the spread. 55 When asked if he thought Tressel
would indeed change the offense for him, Pryor stated, "I believe
him because he said he would, but I really don't know."' 5 6 Yet,
Ohio State is not the only major university saying they will
change their offense for Pryor. He noted that while he does not
like Penn State's offense, "They said they'll bring the spread with
57
me, but I don't know."
A casual observer might wonder what the harm is in
suggesting to a PSA that a football team is willing to change their
system for a particular player and then renege on the promise.
After all, athletes are expected to be versatile, especially when
they are young. However, college football is unique in that the
offensive or defensive scheme run by a particular university has a
dramatic impact on the type of athlete needed for each position.58
If a PSA signs with a particular institution expecting that
institution to run a particular style of play and the coaching staff
fails to follow through, the potential playing time for that studentathlete could diminish dramatically. Not all football skills are
easily transferable, particularly for those playing the so-called
"skill" positions of quarterback, wide receiver and running back.
Diminished playing time means diminished opportunities to
be seen by NFL scouts, which in turn makes a future NFL career
less and less likely. 59 While a student has the ability to transfer
to another institution, he can transfer only if the head football
coach of his current school grants him a release. 60 The football
player then must agree to sit out for one year if transferring
within the Football Bowl Subdivision and two years if transferring
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Nowhere can this be best illustrated than by the struggles of the
University of Nebraska after its football team when from a team that ran the
option for around four decades to one that moved to the so-called "West Coast
Offense". See Brian Christopherson, Bo's Show: Pelini becomes Nebraska's
28th Head Football Coach, LINCOLN J. STAR, Dec. 3, 2007 at D1. Changing an
entire play-calling scheme is not a small thing and often takes years of
adjustment.
59. The vast majority of college football players see the potential of
playing in the NFL as one of the major reasons for picking a University. See
Robert Andrew Powell, For Lesser Talents, It's the Hard Way Every Time,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 2004, at D2.
60.

See NCAAMANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.1.1.3.
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within a conference. 6 1 For an athlete who spends his entire career
working for the possibility at becoming an NFL draft pick, 62 the
misrepresentation is not a small one and can dramatically affect
his future earning potential. Meanwhile, there are no NCAA
63
sanctions for coaches who engage in this activity.

Why would a coach tell a PSA that he is willing to change the
playbook for him and then refuse to do so? It seems like a waste
of time and effort to make these promises and then renege. It
could be that simple inertia keeps a coach from changing the
playbook even after he promised to do so. However, a more
disturbing possibility is that coaches recruit top athletes not
necessarily for their program, but to keep them away from the
competition. For example, Team A may not run the option, but
Team B does and its Team A's strongest competitor. By keeping a
talent option-running PSA away from the competition, a coach
still gains an advantage over Team B, even if the PSA never steps
on the football field. It is easy to see why a coach could have the
incentive to lie in this situation. The NCAA transfer rules aid the
coach because once a student-athlete realizes his situation and
decides to transfer, he will be forced to sit out a minimum of one
year. 64 Perhaps Terrelle Pryor said it best that when it comes to
changing a football playbook it is extraordinarily difficult to
' 65
determine, "who's lying and who's not.

(2) Scenario Two: I'm Not Leaving this University, it's My Dream
Job
Head coaches are often the heart of a college football program
and often "receive most of the credit and criticism of an athletic
program." 66 Because of this pressure and high visibility, college

61. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 14.5.1.
62. This is not to suggest that all college football players attend a
university with the sole intention of playing professional football. However,
the majority of Football Bowl Subdivision football players have that dream,
even if it is an unrealistic one.
63. One could argue that the coach will suffer "reputational harm" but
that provides little comfort for an athlete who never gets the chance to step
out on the field.
64. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 14.5.1.
65. Evans, supranote 53, at D4.

66. Martin J. Greenberg & Jay J. Smith, A Study of Division I Assistant
Football and Men's Basketball Coaches Contracts, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 25,
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football coaches are highly compensated with fourteen coaches
making over $2 million per year and four coaches earning over $3
million per year during the 2006 season. 67 Nowhere are the
stakes higher and the pressure more intense than at the
University of Michigan. Former head football coach and athletic
director Bo Schembeckler, when asked about loyalty to the
University, famously quipped, "A Michigan Man is going to coach
at Michigan." 68 After the 2007 football season when long time
coach Lloyd Carr announced he would retire from coaching, the
question became who is this 'Michigan Man" going to be?
Rumors abounded shortly after Carr's retirement with the
most likely candidate, LSU's Les Miles, stating he was not
interested in the job. 69 However, Michigan found their "Michigan
Man" in the University of West Virginia's Rich Rodriguez.
Michigan has a reputation of honesty and integrity when dealing
with football players, coaches and staff70 yet the hiring of
The
Rodriguez has been extraordinarily controversial.
when
he
West
Virginia
days
at
controversy extends to Rodriguez's
used the University of Alabama's interest in him to "leverage"
salary increases and perks. 7 1 In exchange for those perks,
Rodriguez had a $4 million dollar buyout written into his contract
at the University of West Virginia. 72 Currently, the University of
West Virginia is suing Rodriguez for breach of contract after
Rodriguez failed to pay the buyout on time. 73 Further, some of
26 (Fall 2007).
67. Id.
68. WVU's Reputation Damaged? WVU's Reputation at Stake?, PITTSBURG
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 22, 2008, at D1. In the interest of full disclosure, this
comment was actually made regarding a basketball coach, but it maintains
the same applicability when discussing college football. Id.
69. Pete Thamel, With Miles Staying Put, Michigan Talks to Schiano,
N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at D1.
70. Mitch Albom, Rodriguez Mess: West Virginia's Troubles Could One
Day be Michigan's, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 20, 2008. However, not even
Michigan is immune from criticism. Rodriguez's hiring created resentment
among current Michigan football players who openly criticized the team. See
Angelique S. Chengelis, "Departing U-M lineman blasts program",
http://www.detnews.comlapps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080326/
SPORTS0201/803260444, (Last Visited, March 28, 2008).
71. Id.
72. Stephanie Loh, WVU Files Amended Complaint: Asserts Breach of
ContractAgainst Rod, THE DOMINION POST, Jan. 22, 2008.
73. Id.
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Rodriguez's conduct during the negotiations between himself and
the University of Michigan was described as "unethical.'' 74 Eight
hours away from giving his official resignation, Rodriguez had yet
to tell his players that he was leaving and he allegedly shredded
documents at West Virginia before he left. 75 However, what was
arguably the most scandalous part of Rodriguez's departure was
that while he did not tell his players that he was leaving, he did
manage to make one phone call before he left; he called Terrelle
Pryor to let him know that he was leaving West Virginia for
Michigan. 76 Making matters even worse, Rodriguez utilized West
Virginia's one phone call per week allowed for Terrelle Pryor as he
was walking out the door. 77 This made it impossible for West
Virginia to call him and mitigate any damage done by Rodriguez.
Even in his last hours at West Virginia, Rodriguez's first
thought was to call a top college recruit to let him know of his
plans. This emphasizes the influence the head football coach has
on the decision made by the PSA. It has been noted that, "A coach
is often the most influential reason for a recruit choosing a
school."' 78 Because of this influence, a head coach may conceal or
lie to a PSA during recruiting in order to get him to commit to his
program. The rationale is if the coach decides to stay at his
institution, either because other offers were not as lucrative or he
used his leverage to improve his contract, he will need that PSA to
play for him. If he does leave his institution, he can use his new
exposure to recruit new players or attempt to try and sway other
recruits.

However it turns out, it is a win-win situation for the

coach. As one sports writer noted, "A head coach can sign a 10year deal, say he's found his final job, promise recruits they'll be
part of a glorious future at XYZ U and then leave before the first
7
year's over."

9

Again, for a coach committing this type of fraud, there is no

74. Dave Hickman, Rodriguez's Selfish Acts May Well be His Downfall,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 17, 2008, at lB.

75.

Id.

76. Id.
77. Id..
78. Art Thiel, If Coach Bolts, Let the Players Go Too, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 19, 2007, at Fl.
79. Jim Thomas, Coaching Searches Get Thumbs Down, DAILY NEWS,

Dec. 20, 2007, at C3.
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punishment within the NCAA rules, while the potential
consequences for the student-athlete are immense. Other than
the repercussions mentioned in Section II. A., there is the
emotional trauma of dealing with a new head coach and the time
and effort spent learning a new football system. Proposals have
been made such as forcing college coaches who leave to sit out a
year before they are eligible to coach again 80 or immediately
releasing all players from their institution, making them a type of
"free agent. 8 1 However, none of these suggestions have been
implemented and NCAA reform continues to focus on the
misconduct of the PSA or student-athlete. 8 2 Luckily for the
University of Michigan, few of Lloyd Carr's recruits have revoked
their verbal commitments. 83 This is unusual for universities
undergoing coaching changes. 84 Meanwhile, any player at West
Virginia who wants to play for his beloved former head coach must
85
sit out a year and obtain a release from their new head coach.
(3) Scenario Three: You will Start as a True Freshman
We return once again to Terrelle Pryor, who has coaches
asking to land helicopters at his high school and receives breaking
news directly from head coaches discussing their next coaching
job. Apparently, Rich Rodriguez's last minute phone call from
West Virginia had an impact on Pryor. He decided to spend one of
his official visits at the University of Michigan.8 6 During his visit,
Pryor attended the Michigan-Iowa basketball game and was
80. See Fleeing Coaches Should Redshirt, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM,
Dec. 18, 2007, at 1C.
81. See Theil, supra note 79, at Fl.
82. For example see NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.2.2.1,
requiring the PSA to repay any improper benefit in order to regain his
eligibility.
83. See Antione Pitts, U-M Hasn't Lost Recruits ...
Yet, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Dec. 16, 2007, at D10.
84. Id.
85. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.1.1.3, "An athletics staff
member or other representative.. .shall not make contact with the studentathlete of another NCAA or NAIA four-year collegiate institution, directly or
indirectly , without first obtaining the written permission of the first
institution's athletic director..." While the language of the rule says athletic
director, it is the head coach who will ultimately make this decision.
86.

Bernard Fernandez, Penn State off Pryor's List?, PHILA. DAILY NEWS,

Jan. 21, 2008, at 107.
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greeted by the student section chanting, "We want Pryor" and
"Come to Michigan. '8 7 One of the most appealing aspects of
playing at Michigan is the fact that Michigan could give Pryor the
chance to start as a true freshman because Rodriguez is bringing
the spread offense he ran at West Virginia with him.8 8 LSU, a
recent player in the competition for Pryor's services, cannot make
the same promise because of the number of players available to
play quarterback. 8 9 The chance that Pryor would need to "wait
his turn" is high, particularly with LSU's success at the
quarterback position. For athletes, playing time is the ultimate
indicator of current talent and future success. Not only is there
the ability to compete that most athletes crave, there is also the
attention that follows on the field success such as television
appearances and the notice of NFL scouts. There is little doubt
that starting as a true freshman will have a significant impact on
Pryor's decision.
The importance of playing time for a college football player
cannot be understated. This is demonstrated by the rash of
"disappointment lawsuits" that occur when student-athletes and
their parents sue on the basis that athletic talent has been
misused. 90 The promise of playing time for a college football
player has been litigated as far back as 1993 with the case of the
"crybaby quarterback," 9 1 Fortay v. University of Miami.9 2 Fortay

alleged there existed an oral contract between himself and former
head football coach Dennis Erickson in which Erickson promised
to give Fortay the starting quarterback position if he signed an
NLI with the University of Miami. 93 Further, Fortay claimed that
the "representations by Miami athletic officials were the principal

87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.

90. Timothy Epstein, Splintersfrom the Bench: Feasibility of Lawsuits by
Athletes Against Coaches and Schools for Lack of Playing Time, 4 VA. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 174, 187 (2005). It is worth noting that lawsuits for lack of
playing time are not unique to college football. See Id.

91. Timothy Davis, College Athletics: Testing the Boundaries of Contract
and Tort, 29 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 971, 974 (1996).
92. Fortay v. Univ. of Miami, Civ. A. No 93-3443, 1994 WL 62319, Feb.

17, 1994 at *1.
Additionally there was a charge
misrepresentation which will be discussed in Section V infra.
93. Epstein, supra note 90, at 187.

of negligent
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reasons he matriculated to the institution."' 94
During his
recruitment, the University of Miami advertised their ability to
develop NFL-quality quarterbacks. 9 5 Further, Fortay stated that
he committed to Miami believing he would, "be the starting
96
quarterback at UM and the team would be built around him."
Instead of obtaining the starting position, Gino Torretta was
named the starting quarterback and he went on to win the
Heisman Trophy in 1992. 9 7 Fortay transferred to Rutgers, but
98
was never able to realize the promise he had at Miami.
Eventually the University of Miami and Fortay settled the case
out of court. 99

Promising playing time as a true freshman is yet another
example of how coaches can mislead top prospects in order to get
them to commit to their university. Arguably, there are very few
PSAs who would be content with sitting on the bench. With the
desire to play in the NFL motivating the majority of college
football recruits, 10 0 the promise of immediate playing time seems
all too tempting. What increases the temptation to rely on the
coach's promise for playing time is that many college football
players do play immediately as a true freshman. 10 1 As stated in
Section I, the NCAA legislation making freshman football players
immediately eligible and the reduction in the maximum number of
scholarships to eighty-five had a tremendous impact on both the
sport and recruiting. While being told by Penn State and Ohio
State that they will change their offense might seem a little
suspicious to Terrelle Pryor, hearing that he will start as a true
freshmen seems much more realistic.
Nevertheless, young PSAs are unfamiliar with the process
that goes into picking a starting line up. Some returning players
dramatically improve during summer conditioning and true
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Davis, supra note 91, at 975.
Fortay, 1994 WL 62319 at *3.
Id. at *4.
Epstein, supranote 90, at 187.
Davis, supra note 91, at 975.
Epstein, supra note 90, at 187.
See Powell, supranote 59, at D2.

101.

See Tommy Bowman, ASU to Start Six Newcomers against Michigan,

WINSTON-SALEM J. Aug. 28, 2007. Interestingly enough, Appalachian State
(ASU) beat Michigan in the 2007-2008 college football season in one of the
greatest upsets in college football history.
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freshmen have the huge obstacle of learning the playbook. What
is more compelling is the fact that many true freshmen must
adjust to life away from home and all freshmen must adjust to life
as a collegiate student-athlete. These are factors that veteran
players do not need to experience. Finally, every freshman
football player believes they will be the one who will start as a
true freshman, but out of the entire freshman class that a football
team brings in, only a handful will play as a true freshman. Many
of those obtain their positions because of injury or as an option of
last resort. Even though some freshmen do play, the statistics are
against a true freshman setting foot on the field.
III. A CAUSE OF ACTION: TORT VS. CONTRACT

The thought of bringing a cause of action against a coach and
a university is not a new idea, as demonstrated by Fortay and his
lawsuit against the University of Miami. The majority of legal
scholarship and litigation regarding student-athletes involves
lawsuits grounded in contract. This is a natural inclination
because a PSA signs an NLI after committing to a university, a
10 2
document that does resemble a contract in many ways.
Further, a student-athlete signs a financial aid agreement
outlining the terms and conditions for his scholarship. Some tort
litigation and legal scholarship has been generated mostly in the
area of personal injury from injuries suffered on the field and the
unique area of educational malpractice. 103
However, little
litigation has been pursued under the theory of fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentation. The most common rationale for the
lack of tort lawsuits under the fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation theory is the problem of quantifying damages
for the student-athlete. Additionally, there are potential proof
problems because many of the conversations between PSAs and
football coaches occur in private. This could turn the cause of

102. "The NLI is 'a contract of sorts a written agreement.. .The most
important service the program does is cease the recruiting process when the

kid signs."' Michael Riella, Leveling the Playing Field:Applying the Doctrines
of Unconscionability and Condition Precedent to Effectuate Student-Athlete
Intent Under the National Letter of Intent, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2181, 2187
(2002).
103. See Thomas R. Hurst and James N. Knight, Coaches Liability for
Athletes'Injuries and Deaths, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 27 (2003).
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action into a "he said, she said" disagreement. However, juries
deal with these types of issues on a routine basis and to deny a
student-athlete a remedy in tort would essentially create a wrong
without a remedy. Additionally, fraudulent misrepresentation
claims outside of the sports arena are common and many times
successful. 104
By analogizing to these successful claims, a
student-athlete could legitimately frame a cause of action under
misrepresentation. Finally, one of the most important reasons for
initiating a tort cause of action is to encourage the NCAA to
reform its current policies. By winning a tort claim and obtaining
the corresponding monetary judgment, the NCAA will need to
revaluate its policies to prevent further lawsuits.
A. Student-Athlete Lawsuits and Legal Scholarship in Contract:
the NLI and the Financial Aid Agreement
Before the merits of a tort lawsuit can be fully illustrated, it is
important to outline why suits by student-athletes under contract
prove ineffective. The most common target for both lawsuits and
criticism in the coach/student-athlete relationship is the NLI.
Both student-athletes and legal scholars have argued the NLI is
an adhesion contract because the terms of the NLI are "take it or
leave it." 105 PSAs are not allowed to go out and negotiate the
terms of their scholarship on an individual basis. In fact, the NLI
itself states that no changes of any sort may be made to the
document.1 0 6 The only bargaining power that a PSA possesses is
07
the opportunity to decide which school they choose to attend.1
While the athlete does has the ability to choose which university
and football coach he will play for, the terms of the "contract" are
the same wherever he goes, making his choice "devoid of
08

consequence." 1

The major problem with pursuing a cause of action under

104. For example see Price v. Highland Community Bank, 932 F. 2d 601
(7th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. S & L. Acquisition Co., 940 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir.
1991); Berger v. Security Pacific Information Systems, Inc., 795 P.2d 1380
(Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
105. Riella, supra note 102, at 2209-10.
106. Stacey Meyer, Unequal Bargaining Power: Making the National
Letter of Intent More Equitable, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L.REV. 227, 234 (2004).
107. Id.
108. Riella, supra note 102, at 2212.
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contract using the NLI as the foundation for the suit is that while
the NLI is a binding agreement, all it promises is to provide
financial aid for a PSA who attends a university for one academic
year. 109 There are no other promises such as guaranteeing
playing time, turning the PSA into a "star," or building the team
around him. 11 This is not to say that these promises have not
been made, but they are not documented in the NLI. Further,
attempting to enforce oral promises made under an NLI runs into
the parol evidence rule, making proof of the promises incredibly
difficult. Another problem with the NLI is that it is only a oneyear agreement. After that one year is over, renewal of a studentathlete's scholarship is based on the opinion of the head coach and
the athletic director.'1 1
After the PSA's first year at the
university, "neither the institution nor the athlete carries any
obligations under the NLI." i 2 A student-athlete might not
recognize that he has made a bad choice until well after that first
year is over. To rely on the NLI as the basis for a cause of action
under contract provides too narrow a window under which to
bring suit.
In addition to the NLI, a financial aid agreement must be
signed by both the PSA and the institution in order to make the
NLI valid. "13 The NLI states that by itself it does not constitute a
contract because it requires an offer of athletics financial aid for it
to become binding."i 4 The financial aid agreement dictates the
terms of the scholarship, including the length of the scholarship
and the requirement that all NCAA and conference rules must be
followed.1 1 5 The financial aid agreement, unlike the NLI, is
signed on a year-by-year basis. Some courts have found a
protected interest in the financial aid agreement guaranteeing a
scholarship for one academic year.1 1 6 Yet, the only interest

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Meyer, supra note 106, at 233.
Id.
Riella, supra note 102, at 2187.
Id.
Meyer, supra note 106, at 229.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 230. Currently, all scholarships for the sport of football are so-

called "full" scholarships because they include room, board, books, tuition and
fees, the maximum allowed by the NCAA. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14,
Bylaw 15.1.
116. See Meyer, supra note 106, at 232. See also, Hysaw v. Washburn
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protected in the financial aid agreement is the promise of a
scholarship. There is nothing in the financial aid agreement that
confirms any promises made by a coach during the recruiting
process. 117 Further, the financial aid agreement suffers from the
same problem as that of the NLI; it is only valid on a yearly basis
and by the time the student-athlete realizes he was lied to, the
financial aid agreement may have expired.
The most famous case dealing with the possibility of a
contractual relationship between a student-athlete and an
institution is Ross v. Creighton University.1 18 In Ross, the
plaintiff alleged that Creighton University, in exchange for his
commitment to play basketball, would provide educational
assistance for him because he came from an "academically
disadvantaged background." 1 19
When Ross left Creighton
University, he maintained a D average, had only 96 of the 128
credits required for graduation and had the reading skills of a
fourth grader. 120
Ross sued under contract alleging that
Creighton breached their contractual obligation by failing to
provide, "any real opportunity to participate in and benefit from
the University's academic program." 12 1 The Ross court found that
a contractual relationship did exist between Ross and Creighton
University but severely limited its holding by stating, "[Ross]
must point to an identifiable contractual promise that the
12 2
defendant failed to honor."
As stated previously, both an NLI and a financial aid
agreement are limited in what they promise a student-athlete.
Essentially, all that is promised is a scholarship for a one-year
term in exchange for the student-athlete committing to play for
the respective institution. Both documents cannot be modified by
the student-athlete, coach or institution. If a plaintiff attempts to
sue under contract based on promises that the coach will not leave
the university, the coach will change the playbook, or the studentathlete will receive playing time, it will be impossible to find this

Univ.,
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

690 F. Supp. 940, 945-47 (D. Kan. 1987).
Meyer, supra note 106, at 232.
Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 411.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
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documented in either the NLI or the financial aid agreement.
Additionally, the parol evidence rule bars any admission of oral
promises. The courts have set the bar extraordinarily high when
it comes to pleading a successful claim by a student-athlete
against an institution in contract. When a wrong has been
committed against these plaintiffs, it is better to seek a remedy
under tort theories than under contract.
B. Tort Suits Providing Regulation of the NCAA and Football
Coaches
Even though the courts 123 have acknowledged a contractual
relationship between a student-athlete and the university, the
problems with the parol evidence rule and the very narrow
grounds upon which the court will find a breach of contract make
contract based lawsuits prohibitive. A financial aid agreement
and an NLI promise very little to a student-athlete in exchange for
their services. However, most football coaches make several oral
promises on which it is reasonable for a PSA to rely. Further,
student-athletes with goals of playing in the NFL suffer
significant harm because of reliance on those promises. While a
harm has been committed, a remedy must be found in another
area, specifically through tort lawsuits.
While the majority of claims by student-athletes are based in
contract, tort lawsuits are not unusual. Two of the most common
tort lawsuits are personal injury based on a negligence theory 124
and educational hindrance claims when student-athletes leave a
university without a degree or any educational skills. 125 These
examples illustrate is a growing willingness by the courts to
recognize the tort claims of student-athletes. More importantly,
tort represents an area of the law where plaintiffs seek relief
against big organizations and powerful individuals who take

123. For an additional case noting a contractual relationship between a
student-athlete and a university, see Taylor v. Wake Forest University, 191
S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
124. For example, see Thomas R. Hurst and James N. Knight, Coaches'
Liability for Athlete's Injuries and Deaths, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 27
(2003).
125. For example, see Monica L. Emerick, The University/Student-Athlete
Relationship:Duties Giving Rise to a Potential EducationalHindrance Claim,
44 UCLA L. REV. 865 (1997).
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advantage of those in a weaker position. Whether it is product
liability claims, environmental hazard claims, or personal injury
claims, the law provides plaintiffs with a remedy in tort. As
mentioned previously, the majority of NCAA regulation focuses on
the misconduct of the PSA or the student-athlete, not the head
football coach. Even if a coach violates NCAA rules, it is the
institution and the team that bears the consequences. 12 6 Yet, the
person suffering the most from the misrepresentations made by
coaches are the student-athletes themselves and they are left with
no remedy. The NCAA and college football coaches should not be
immune from the civil justice system simply because of their
power or iconic status. By supplying student-athletes with a
remedy in tort, it places college football coaches on notice that
they will be held liable for the promises they make during
recruiting. The most effective way to make a tort claim by a
student-athlete is through the torts of fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation.
IV. APPLYING

THE FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION ELEMENTS TO
RECRUITING PROMISES

Under a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation a person who
"fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or
refrain from action in reliance. . .is liable to the other for the harm
caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation." 127 Arguably, torts of this type are rampant
throughout the recruiting process. Each of the three scenarios
discussed in section III, supra, illustrate how coaches commit
fraudulent misrepresentation in order to influence the conduct of
the PSA. However, like all torts, a student-athlete must prove all
of the elements in order to state a claim. The elements of
fraudulent misrepresentation include scienter, inducement,
justifiable reliance and harm. When applying these to oral

126. The most common sanction for NCAA recruiting violations is the,
"student-athlete's becoming ineligible to represent that institution in
intercollegiate athletics." NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.01.1.
However, a university can be fined and lose scholarships based on repeated
violations. See Brooks, supra note 49, at 11.
127.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
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promises made by football coaches, it is apparent that a claim
under fraudulent misrepresentation is a genuine prospect.
A.

Element one: Scienter

The word "fraudulent" refers to a person's knowledge that
what they are saying is untrue and is sometimes called
scienter. 1 28 This element is evident in all three scenarios where
coaching misconduct occurs during the recruiting process. First,
coaches know how difficult it is to change an entire play-calling
scheme. There is usually a huge adjustment period when a coach
changes the style of offense or defense they are accustomed to
running. Further, when the coach changes the play calling
system, it involves personnel changes at many positions, not just a
few. To suggest that a coach is willing to change their entire
playbook just for one player is a stretch at best. Secondly, the
yearly head coaching changes within college football are
legendary. For a coach to suggest that he is committed to staying
at one institution for an extended period of time defies the
realities of college football. Finally, to tell a PSA that he will start
as a true freshman fails to take into consideration the dynamics of
a football team itself. A veteran on the team could make huge
strides during the off season and in a head to head competition for
a position, the PSA could find himself left out of the starting
lineup. A coach, no matter what promises are made, will put the
best eleven players out on the field because it is these eleven
players that give him the best opportunity to win. As stated
previously, winning means job security or they chance to obtain
his "dream job."
One could argue that a coach has no idea what he is telling a
PSA is false. It is possible that the coach genuinely believes that
what he is telling the PSA is true, but circumstances change
making it impossible for him to fulfill his promise. However, a
statement that is a prediction or a promise can be construed as, "a
statement that the maker knows of nothing which will make the
fulfillment of his prediction or promise impossible or
improbable."' 12 9 To suggest that coaches are unaware of the
difficulties of changing play calling, the likelihood of accepting
128. RESTATEMENT
129. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 526, cmt. a (1977).
§ 525 cmt. f (1977).
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another coaching position, or who will be the best fit for a
particular position is to deny the intellect of those who coach the
game. Arguably, football coaches are making promises to PSAs
that they, at best, do not know if they will be able to fulfill and, at
worst, know are impossibilities. Also, they are making these
promises with the intent that the PSAs act or not act.
Because of the lack of case law regarding student-athletes
suing in tort, it is necessary to analogize student-athlete claims to
other
successful
claims
brought
under
fraudulent
misrepresentation. The type of scienter involving the recruiting of
student-athletes is most analogous to the scienter involving an
employer's misrepresentations made to a prospective employee
regarding the terms of employment. 130 Courts have held that a
promise for a job or the continuation of a current one combined
with the intent not to carry out the promise represents actionable
fraud. 1 3 ' While the athlete-coach relationship is not defined as an
employer-employee relationship, 132 there are many aspects of
both relationships that are similar. In particular, the way a
football coach recruits a student-athlete is comparable to when an
employer recruits a highly paid, high profile corporate executive.
Both coaches and corporations believe that this person could make
the difference for their organization. In order to obtain the
services of a CEO who can turn around a company, oral promises
are made about benefits such as stock options, housing benefits, or
various corporate perks. 1 33 While football coaches are precluded
by NCAA rules to make any type of monetary promises, 13 4 they do
make promises that impact a player's future career. If employers
130. P.G. Guthrie, Annotation, Employer's misrepresentation as to
prospect, or duration, of employment as actionablefraud, 24 A.L.R. 3d 1412,
(1969).
131. Id.
132. College football players are considered amateurs because they cannot
receive "pay" for their services. This has not stopped legal scholars from
arguing that an employer-employee relationship exists. See Jonathan L.H.
Nygren, Forcing the NCAA to Listen: Using Labor Law to Force the NCAA to
Bargain Collectively with Student-Athletes, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 359
(2003).
133. It is interesting to note that these highly compensated individuals
are often successful when they sue for the enforcement of oral promises made
during recruiting. See e.g., Ohania v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc., 779 F.2d
101 (2d. Cir. 1985).
134. NCAA MANUAL, supranote 13, Bylaw 13.2.2.
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are held accountable for fraud during "recruiting" there is no
reason why football coaches should not be held liable.
B.

Element two: Inducement

Under the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, the maker of
the misrepresentation is liable to the people, "to whom it [the
promise] is made with the intent to cause them to act in reliance
upon it."1 35 To fulfill the requirement of inducement the plaintiff
must show that, "he acts for the purpose of causing it [action] or
acts believing that there is a substantial certainty that such a
In other words,
result will follow from his conduct."1 36
inducement occurs when a tortfeasor makes a particular
statement with the goal of producing a certain result. This is
arguably the easiest element to prove when looking at the
coach/PSA relationship during recruiting. The whole purpose of
official visits, telephone conversations, direct mailings and text
messages are to induce the PSA to sign an NLI for one school
while refusing an opportunity to sign with another. It would be
difficult to find a situation where a coach was acting for a reason
other than to induce the PSA to make a choice. It could be argued
that a coach is simply giving a PSA advice and is not inducing him
to act. However, this is highly unlikely and the NCAA rules
reflect that coaches, through the recruiting process, are trying to
induce PSAs to act. 137 Further, there is strong incentive for the
coach to get the PSA to act or not act so he can plan what type of
personnel he will need for the future.
When analogizing inducement to successful fraudulent
misrepresentation claims, the most logical analogy is when an
employer successfully induces a prospective employee to either
retire or quit his previous job in favor of a new job at the
employer's company. There are numerous cases illustrating a
successful claim under this cause of action as demonstrated by the
case selections following the Restatement's illustration of
fraudulent misrepresentation.1 38 However, the case containing

135.
136.

531 (1938).
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 531 cmt. a (1938).
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §

137. See, e.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 13.1 limiting the
number of times a coach can contact and evaluate a PSA.
138.

See RESTATEMENT

OF TORTS § 531 (1938).
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facts most analogous to the recruiting of college football players is
Smyth v. Fleishmann. 139 In Smyth, the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation
could be brought when a hotel owner lured away a popular
employee of a rival hotel with the intention of never offering her
long-term employment. 140 This is similar to the situation where
football coaches induce PSAs to sign with their program in an
effort to keep them away from the competition. These coaches
never intend to actually let the student-athlete play for them, they
only seek to disadvantage the competition. By inducing these
athletes into this decision, they are deprived of the opportunity to
play for a team that actually wants to utilize the PSA's talent.
This deprivation of playing time causes harm to the studentathlete, especially if his goal is to pursue a career in the NFL. 141
C. Element Three: Justifiable Reliance
While it may be relatively easy to show that a coach intends
to induce action on behalf of the PSA, it is more difficult to show
that a PSA's reliance on what the coach said was justifiable. In
order for reliance to be justifiable, the fact misrepresented must
be material.1 42 A fact is defined as material "if its existence or
nonexistence is a matter to which a reasonable man would attach
importance in determining his choice of action... or the maker of
the representation knows that its recipient is likely to regard that
fact as important although a reasonable man would not so regard
it."' 1 4 3 It can be argued that it is unreasonable for a PSA to rely on
the promise that a coach stay at a university or that a coach will
change the playbook because all of the evidence suggests that
these things do not occur. The media constantly reports on
coaching changes 144 and fans are often in an uproar when coaches

139.

Smyth v. Fleischmann, 52 S.E. 2d 199, (S.C. 1949)
Id.
141. It is extraordinarily rare for a student-athlete to not harbor dreams
of playing in the NFL. Even if he does not maintain a desire to play
professionally, he still suffers harm because the coach is depriving him of the
chance to play football. To remove such an important part of one's life is not
a small matter.
142. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538 (1938).
143. Id.
144. Thomas, supra note 79, at C3.
140.
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suggest changes to the playbook.

Even though it is not unusual

for true freshman to get playing time, the odds are still stacked
against him. Only a handful of recruits from a recruiting class
numbering up to 25 players' 45 will ever see the field their first
year. With all of these facts, how can a PSA justifiably rely?
The answer to this question comes from the second prong of a
making
the
the
person
material
misrepresentation:
misrepresentation knows that the recipient will rely even if a
reasonable person would not. 146 Athletes are taught from a very
early age to follow the recommendations of their coach to the
letter. Due to the size of a football team's squad 147 it is
particularly important to follow the rules made by the coach in
order to prevent disorder among such a large group of people.
Having been a part of this culture for such a long time, football
players are accustomed to taking coaches at their word. The
importance of a coach in a football player's life is tremendous and
coaches are even more influential on athletes that come from
disadvantaged backgrounds. When looking at the unique culture
of football, it is easy to see how a reasonable person may not rely
on the promises made by a football coach, but a reasonable
football player would.
One of the more famous cases involving justifiable reliance is
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur. 14 8 In that case, executives of an oil and
gas company exercised their stock options before it became public
knowledge that the company found a large reserve of minerals in
Canada. 14 9 The defendants attempted to argue that they did not
need to disclose the findings before they purchased stock because
the prospect at any gain from the mineral discovery was still
speculative 150 and that a reasonable person would not have relied
on that information. 151 The Second Circuit Court held that it did
not matter that the gain was speculative because a reasonable
145. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, Bylaw 15.5.1 limiting the number
of new scholarships to 25 per year.
146.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 538 (1938).

147. While the NCAA limits available scholarships to 85 per football team,
squad sizes can be much larger when non-scholarship "walk-ons" are added to
the roster. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 14, Bylaw 15.5.1.
148. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
149. Id. at 840.
150. Id. at 849.
151. Id.
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person would want to know this information before making a
decision. 152 While this case involved a lawsuit based on securities
law, it is significant for the definition of what a reasonable person
would want to know. A reasonable football player would want to
know if a coach might entertain offers from other schools, if there
is a possibility a coach will not change the playbook, and if there
are other "rising stars" on the team who might compete for his
position. A coach cannot use the defense that the answers to all of
these questions are speculative; a PSA has the right to know the
answers. Additionally, this case is significant because PSAs are in
a similar position to that of the stockholders in Texas Gulf Sulfur;
they place their trust in those in control to make the best decisions
for all parties involved. A coach is supposed to put the best
players on the field so the team can win. A CEO is supposed to
make financial decisions that will benefit all stockholders. This
makes PSAs like stockholders because both groups are
particularly susceptible to misconduct from those in control.
D. Element Four: Harm
Perhaps the most difficult element to prove in a fraudulent
misrepresentation claim is the type of harm that has been caused.
The measure of damages in a fraudulent misrepresentation claim
is "the pecuniary loss which results from the falsity of the matter
misrepresented." 15 3 A difficult obstacle to overcome is the exact
measure of pecuniary damages a plaintiff suffers from. A studentathlete could claim that a coach cost him his opportunity at a long
professional football career because he did not keep the promises
made during recruiting. He could point to the fact that he was
forced to sit on the bench while others received playing time
because the coach failed to change the play-calling scheme or did
not put him on the field when he was a true freshman. Also, a
student-athlete could state that when the coach left the university
for another job, a new coach came in who wanted to bring in "his
guys" and the student-athlete was forced to transfer and sit out a
year losing valuable time.
The problem with these arguments is it is difficult to quantify

152.

Id.

153.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 549 (1938).
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the plaintiffs damages. The opportunity to play in the NFL is not
guaranteed and to suggest that a plaintiff would have a long
career in the NFL provided a coach would not have induced him to
make a poor recruiting choice involves some amount of
speculation. Yet one author noted, "At first glance, an individual's
claim that a university ruined a lifelong dream of playing in the
NFL might seem a bit tenuous. However, the basic issues are
familiar ones for which the law has cleared a fairly defined path
over the years." 1 54 By committing fraud during the recruiting
process, the coach denies the ability of a PSA to make an informed
choice; a choice that could make a substantial difference in his
ability to earn future profits. This is analogous to the situation of
the shareholders in Texas Gulf Sulfur. The court noted in Texas
Gulf Sulfur, it did not matter that the potential profits were
speculative. 155 The failure of the corporate executives to tell the
shareholders of the discovery of significant mineral rights denied
them the opportunity to make a financial decision to buy more
stock or keep the stock they already owned. It did not matter to
the court whether they did make a profit or did not make a profit,
only that they lacked an informed choice. 156 Juries are asked to
make monetary determinations regarding damages all the time
and they understand when someone has been wronged and how to
best compensate that person. While this is not to suggest that
determining monetary damages will be easy, it can be overcome.
It is worth noting that because the use of these fraudulent
recruiting promises is widespread, there are a significant number
of PSAs who suffer from harm as a result of those promises. Yet,
the NCAA continues to focus on the misconduct of studentathletes rather than the misconduct of coaches. Some type of
reform within the NCAA is needed to protect the student-athlete
from fraudulent misrepresentation during recruiting. A jury
would be able to see the abuses by coaching staffs across the
country and by providing a monetary remedy could precipitate the
needed reform. Traditionally, tort law has served this role within
154. James Ornstein, Broken Promises and Broken Dreams: Should we
Hold College Athletic Programs Accountable for Breaching Representations
Made in Recruiting Student-Athletes?, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 641, 647
(1996).
155. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d at 849.
156. Id.
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the American legal system. It would only take a handful of
successful lawsuits for both the NCAA and college football coaches
to be put on notice that fraud committed during the recruiting
process is unacceptable and reform within the NCAA is
required. 157 A harm is entitled to a remedy and a well-prepared
lawyer could use not only the pecuniary loss, but the series of
systematic abuses as a way to win a PSA's claim.
V.

APPLYING NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION TO RECRUITING

PROMISES

As
the
previous
discussion
indicates,
fraudulent
misrepresentation is applicable when a football coach is
consciously aware of his fraud and that fraud causes harm to a
student-athlete.
Yet, there are times when it could be
extraordinarily difficult to prove that a football coach had the
required scienter to prove fraudulent misrepresentation. 158 There
may also be circumstances when the coach did intend to keep his
recruiting promises, but something unforeseen prevented him
from carrying them out. For example, a football coach may plan to
give the starting position to a recruit, but an upper classman may
have a spectacular off-season and become the logical choice for the
starting position. Despite this change in circumstances, it does
not excuse the negligence1 59 of the coach in making these promises
in the first place. Even if the coach believed the statement to be

157.

As a matter of fact, using the legal system as a way to change NCAA

regulation has already been a successful tactic. A series of lawsuits based
under the ADA were brought by learning disabled PSAs alleging the NCAA's
initial eligibility requirements violated their rights. See Paul M. Anderson, A

Cart that Accommodates: Using Case Law to understandthe ADA, Sports and
Casey Martin, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 211, 224-25 (2002). The PSAs won
and the NCAA was forced to dramatically change their initial eligibility
requirements. Id.
158. Negligent misrepresentation requires some of the same elements of
fraudulent misrepresentation including misrepresentation of a material fact,
justifiable reliance and damages. 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 59 (2008). However, the
element of scienter is removed. Id. For a detailed explanation of how a
student-athlete can make a claim under these elements, see supra section IV.
See discussion infra section V.A. regarding the duty element.
159. It could even be argued that the coach's conduct in using one of these
three recruiting promises is reckless because the coach, "does not desire
harmful consequence but nonetheless foresees the possibility and consciously
takes the risk." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (8th ed. 2004).
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true, a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation may still lie
if the coach failed to investigate the facts. 160 Further, negligent
misrepresentation is still actionable even if the misrepresentation
was an "honest mistake." 16 1 In the Fortay case, section III. C.
supra, Fortay stated a claim for negligent misrepresentation
arguing that the University of Miami, "negligently misrepresented
that he would become UM's starting quarterback luring him to
sign with and enroll at UM."1 62 It is unclear how the court would

have responded to this claim because Fortay eventually settled out
of court. 16 3 It is also unclear from the facts of the case why Fortay

argued a negligent misrepresentation claim rather than a
fraudulent misrepresentation claim.
Nevertheless, negligent
misrepresentation is a viable alternative for plaintiffs when the
scienter element is absent or there are proof problems.
A. Is there a Duty of Care to the Student-Athlete?
In order for a student-athlete to state a viable claim for
negligent misrepresentation, he must show that the football coach
owes a duty of care to the student-athlete. 16 4
Negligent
misrepresentation occurs when there is a breach of that duty to
provide correct information to the recruit. 165 The court has been
willing to recognize a duty between a university and a studentathlete. 166 It has been suggested that a university owes a duty of
care to a student-athlete because he has signed an NLI with the
institution.167 However, by relying on the NLI as a document
triggering a duty between student-athlete and coach, a potential
plaintiff runs into problems with the inherent limitations of the
169
NLI. 168 Because an NLI makes few if any promises to the PSA
and does not claim to have any obligations to the PSA other than
160. See Merrill v. William F. Ward Ins., 622 N.E. 2d 743 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993).
161. See Perez Trucking Inc., v. Ryder Truck Rental Inc., 886 P.2d 196
(Wash. App. Ct. 1994).
162. Fortay, 1994 WL 62319 at *6.
163. Epstein, supra note 90, at 187.
164. 37 C.J.S. Fraud§ 59 (2008).
165. Id.
166. Ornstein, supra note 154, at 657.
167. Id. at 666.
168. See supra section III.A.
169. Id.
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to bind them to an institution, relying on the NLI as a document
creating a duty could be a flawed strategy.
A better foundation for a duty of care between a coach and a
student-athlete is based on the "special relationship" between the
football coach and the student-athlete. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit found a duty of care between a
student-athlete and the university based on a "special
relationship." 170
The court noted that, "when a student is
participating as a student-athlete of that university, especially
when that student had been actively and continually recruited, the
same requisite duty of care is instilled." 171 It would seem logical
to extend that "special relationship" to the relationship between a
student-athlete and a coach. First, the coach is an agent of the
university because of his status as an employee of the university.
Both the coach and the university should be held liable for a
breech of this duty. 172 Second, with recruiting of the studentathlete serving as a tie to create this "special relationship," it
makes sense to hold accountable the person most active in the
recruiting.
B. Breach of the Duty of Care During Recruiting
While a coach's duty to a student-athlete can be established,
any prospective plaintiff must also show a breach of that duty.
One of the reasons why a court can impose a duty on the coachathlete relationship is because of, "his superior position to obtain
the needed knowledge and his pecuniary interest in the
transaction." 173 When a coach makes a promise to a PSA, yet fails
to use the information he has correctly or fails to obtain any
information at all, negligent misrepresentation may occur. The
most common scenario where this would happen is when a head
coach fails to check on the athletic development of his
upperclassmen. For example, an upperclassman who suffered
170. Kleinknect v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1367 (3d Cir. 1993).
Kleinknect was a lacrosse player who died of cardiac arrest during practice.
Id. at 1363.
171. Ornstein, supra note 154, at 658 (emphasis added).
172. While it may make sense to sue the university in an effort to find the
"deep pocket," the extraordinary salaries of many of these coaches make them
an equally attractive plaintiff.

173.

37 C.J.S. Fraud§ 59 (2008).
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from a debilitating injury during the prior season might be
making remarkable strides during his rehabilitation in the
training room. A coach may promise a starting position to a PSA
based on his belief that the upperclassman will be unable to play
during the upcoming season or will be less than one hundred
percent. Despite the fact that this was an "honest mistake," the
coach did not obtain the most current health information on this
upperclassman and made a promise to a PSA based on that lack of
knowledge. If coaches are not held accountable for this type of
ignorance, they may purposefully under inform themselves during
the recruiting season to shield themselves from liability.
There are examples of successful negligent misrepresentation
claims that are analogous to college football recruiting. In the
case Galloway v. A/co Development Corp. the defendant managed
to secure investment in a real estate venture from his next-door
neighbors. 174 The defendant maintained to the plaintiffs that the
security of their investment was sound when in actuality the
investment was not adequately secured. 175 The court held that
because the defendant was in "a far better position" than the
plaintiffs to determine the adequacy of the investment, he was
under a duty to determine the truth of his statements. 176 This
case is relevant for two distinct reasons. First, it is important to
note that the defendant in Galloway was seeking investment in
his real estate venture from his neighbors. During recruiting,
coaches often make visits to the home of the recruit 1 77 in an effort
to become "part of the family." While this is not against the rules,
it is worth noting that this familial relationship between a coach
and a student-athlete intensifies the argument that a coach owes
a duty to a student-athlete. Furthermore, coaches, like the
defendant in Galloway, are in a far better position to know what
the PSA needs to hear. By not informing himself of this
information, a coach may make a promise to a PSA that cannot be
fulfilled.

174.
175.
176.
177.

777 P. 2d 506, 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 509.
Id.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, Bylaw 13.14.2.
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V. CONCLUSION

The torts of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation have
become part of the college football recruiting landscape. There are
powerful incentives for a coach to commit these torts and few if
any repercussions. Furthermore, this type of behavior by coaches
happens on a routine basis. While proving a fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentation claim by a student-athlete against a
coach may be difficult, it is critical to provide student-athletes
with this sort of remedy because without it, you have a wrong
without a remedy.
Coaches are free to commit recruiting
violations and continue in their respective careers 178 yet it is the
student-athlete who suffers the most from a coach's misdeeds.
Making the situation worse is the reality that the majority of
NCAA legislation focuses on student-athlete misconduct and not
coaching misconduct. Even if a coach does commit a recruiting
violation, it is the institution that bears the punishment
sometimes long after the coach has left. 179
All of these facts warrant one last look at Terrelle Pryor.
After much deliberation, On March 19, 2008 Pryor eventually
decided to sign an NLI with Ohio State. 180 One of the factors that
drew Pryor to Ohio State was head coach JimTressel's idea of
using him in a role much like Heisman Trophy winner Tim Tebow
was used during his freshman year at the University of Florida;
while acting as a backup, Pryor would be brought into play on
occasional running plays. 18 1 However, the single most important
factor was Pryor's relationship with Tressel. 182
A sports
journalist noted, "If the analysts and prognosticators are right
about his abilities, that choice could help determine the relative
fortunes not only for Ohio State, but for the three other programs

178. Rick Neuheisel was recently named the head football coach at UCLA
despite the fact that the football programs at the University of Colorado and
the University of Washington committed suffered from NCAA violations
under his leadership. See Neuheisel Lands at U.C.L.A., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2007, at 8.
179. Brooks, supranote 48, at 11.

180.

Sean D. Hamill, Ending Suspense, Top Prospect Pryor Picks Ohio

State, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008 at D2.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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he did not choose." 183 This seems like a tremendous amount of
pressure on a young man. Hopefully, he will live up to his billing
and that his recruiting choice will not be one he comes to regret.
Katherine Sulentic*

183. Id.
May 2009 JD candidate Roger Williams University School of Law. The
author would like to thank Professor Larry Ritchie for providing assistance
on this research topic. Additionally, the author would like to thank Estes
Banks and Megan Maciasz for their guidance on this comment.
*

